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Coordination of Infrastructure Investment
Across Levels of Government*
Catherine Gamper and Claire Charbit
Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, OECD

Abstract
The share of public investment spending at sub-national level has been slowly but steadily increasing over
the past two decades across OECD countries. Degrees and forms of decentralization in infrastructure vary
widely across countries, but all governments share a common objective, that is to mobilize authorities
along shared infrastructure policy objectives. This involves managing a complex web of vertical (across
levels of government) and horizontal (across sectors and across the same levels of government)
interdependencies, which require substantial coordination among actors to ensure policy alignment and
quality investments. Asymmetric information, multiple principal-agent relationships and significant
differences in capacities across levels of government in financing and implementing infrastructure
investments have posed important political economic obstacles to improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of public investment outcomes. This paper will look at persisting coordination challenges
more closely by using the results of a recent OECD questionnaire and case studies. It will identify
remedies OECD and some selected non-OECD countries have found that work to address coordination
issues. This paper will demonstrate that ultimately systematic collection and sharing of information is the
key to making coordination work.

*This paper is based on a forthcoming OECD report: OECD (2013a): “Investing Together: Working Effectively
across Levels of Government”, OECD Publishing (forthcoming). A set of good practices, some of which discussed in
this paper, will form part of OECD Principles that will be issued on the “Multi-Level Governance of Public
Investment” (OECD, 2013: 2014 Regional Outlook. Forthcoming.)
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1. Motivation
Decentralization trends in OECD countries have generally led to increased investment spending at
subnational government level. A number of indicators show an average increasing trend over the last 10-15
years, such as the share of total public investment spending1 at the subnational level2 that has been rising
very slowly but steadily since 1995. Central government transfers to subnational governments have
similarly steadily increased since 1995, by an average of 0.7% (Blöchliger and Vammalle, 2009). 60% of
total public spending on education, 40% on health, 30% on economic affairs and 20% on social protection
is spent at the subnational level across OECD countries (OECD, 2011; Charbit, 2011). These averages hide
not only considerable variations with generally bigger shares for subnational governments in federal
countries, but can also not provide a full picture of changes in actual autonomy of governments at
subnational levels. Generally speaking though, the crisis has led to the share of public investment to
decline significantly in some federal countries (e.g. Austria and Switzerland), while increasing in some
unitary ones (e.g. Greece and Norway) (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Changes in the share of subnational governments in total public investment in OECD countries (2007-2011)
Source: OECD National Accounts 2012.

Yet, independent of the institutional context, infrastructure investment entails intensive engagement across
levels of government. Hardly any subnational infrastructure investment is carried out isolated at one level
of government. Partial funding often flows from national or supra-national authorities into projects
managed by subnational governments. Lower tiers of authority often help shape infrastructure priorities,
and contribute to the financing.
As a result, complex situations have been formed that require coordination across levels of government.
Not only do the vertical interactions for infrastructure decisions, financing, and implementation have to be
managed carefully to ensure all levels of government aim at convergent objectives and play by compatible
rules. The management of infrastructure investment frequently also requires horizontal interaction, with
other subnational jurisdictions, as projects may require a certain scale efficiency and may have positive (or
1

Public investment is generally understood as the public expenditure that serves to accumulate physical capital (such
as roads, government buildings etc.) and human capital (capital expenditures linked to education, innovation, and
research and development). Exact definitions vary greatly by country.
2
Subnational here and in the remainder of this paper refers to both the intermediate and the local tiers of government.

Coordination of Infrastructure Investment across Levels of Government

3

sometimes negative) external spillovers which require joint design, financing or implementation. Where
policy makers seek to realize potential complementarities across sectors, it will also involve a second form
of horizontal engagement – collaboration among actors and institutions responsible for different sectoral
policies at different government levels.
Various drivers explain the complexity and the gaps that have arisen in intergovernmental coordination.
Policy making authority, especially also for infrastructure investments, has been progressively more
distributed across levels of government, both downwards to subnational governments and upwards to
supra-national authorities, in the case of European countries. Moreover the private sector’s role has grown
as a result of deregulation of past state-owned monopolies, and the move to joint projects with the private
sector characterizes many public investment choices at the local level. Past OECD work on multi-level
governance points to gaps and potential risks associated with weak coordination mechanisms and weak
capacity at subnational level that will be addressed later in this paper (Charbit 2011, Allain-Dupré, 2011,
Mizell and Allain-Dupré, 2013).
Improving infrastructure governance, especially the coordination mechanisms across levels of government
and line ministries, has become a key to increasing investment efficiency and effectiveness. In the aftermath
of the financial crisis that caused a scissors effect on public finances, i.e. the combined impact of lower tax
revenues and increased demand for social services (Vammalle and Hulbert, 2013), the initial policy
response of many OECD countries was to invest in large-scale stimulus packages, leading to a significant
increase in public infrastructure projects at the subnational level. Following this most OECD governments
have moved to consolidation measures, negatively affecting not only overall public investment spending,
but also private investment spending (Figure 2), and threatening the deterioration of existing capital
through lack of funding for operations and maintenance. Direct investment in the EU was reduced by
6.6%, and even more in countries already hit hard by the crisis, such as in Spain where total public
investment fell by 30% (Dexia, 2012). This has created the imperative to in the first phase disburse and
manage investments rapidly under given administrative constraints and in the second phase to achieve
“more with less”, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the available infrastructure
resources for the creation of new structures, but also for the maintenance of existing ones.
10
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Figure 2 Annual changes (in %) of public and private investment in OECD countries
Source: Vammalle, C. and C. Hulbert (2013), “Sub-National Finances and Fiscal Consolidation: Walking on Thin Ice”, OECD
Regional Development Working Papers, No. 2013/02, OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/5k49m8cqkcf3-en, based on OECD National
Accounts (2012)..

3

4

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

2. Discussion: identification of coordination gaps and existing solutions
Even though degrees and forms of decentralization vary widely, all governments have a common need, that
is to mobilize authorities with different degrees of autonomy along shared infrastructure policy objectives.
As outlined in the introduction to this paper, no level of government works isolated when it comes to
infrastructure programming or project implementation. From objective setting to decision-making on tehg
round and even operations and maintenance, different government tiers need to interact vertically as well
as horizontally, especially as responsibilities have been increasingly distributed across all tiers of
government. To make the most of infrastructure investments, governments need to coordinate accordingly
to avoid a fragmented approach to investment spending, leading to inefficiency (more could be achieved
with the same level of resources), but also allocative ineffectiveness, failing to maximize citizens’
preferences.
Political economy constraints often lie at the heart of coordination failures. First and above all information
asymmetries may exist concerning infrastructure policy objectives of the center at subnational levels, but
also the other way around. Secondly disincentives may exist on lower levels of government to engage
horizontally. This could be because resources from the center are allocated in a way that each jurisdiction
seeks to obtain the highest share. Third the objective of achieving scale efficiency may be dwarfed by
subnational governments seeking political rents from the electorate of their jurisdiction only. Fourth, in a
complex structure of multiple principal-agent relationships between the center and the subnational entities,
accountability may often be blurred, which renders coordination challenging (e.g. as is the case when
citizens do not know who is responsible for which task). Finally, from a center’s perspective there may be
several disincentives to make coordination work. The center may be reluctant to give away full control
over resources and infrastructure policy planning, or may prefer giving it to subnational governments of
their party affiliation, which can act as an impeding factor. In addition, the center may have an incentive to
work with the most capable subnational governments only as coordination is easier to organize, but leaves
other subnational governments subject to distorted incentives for intergovernmental coordination. To make
effective coordination happen requires developing adequate incentives, politically and financially, to both
share information and collaborate across levels of government for public infrastructure provision.
Experiences with mechanisms that facilitate a shared policy agenda and a coordinated approach to
infrastructure investment reveal challenges across OECD countries. Past OECD work and a recently
conducted OECD survey show that OECD countries have used a wide range of mechanisms to align
incentives and policy agendas, sharing of information and increasing accountability across levels of
government. However their functionality is seen by most actors as not very effective.
Gaps in intergovernmental coordination can exist on a programmatic and on a project level. From a
programming perspective, gaps in intergovernmental coordination can arise in aligning policy objectives
across different tiers of the government, or in establishing joint financing mechanisms and budgeting
attached to that. However it can also arise in failing to ensure the right scale for infrastructure investments
that often reaches beyond established administrative boundaries. This could result in gaps in horizontal
coordination that should facilitate cross-jurisdictional collaboration (Table 1). In addition to potential gaps
arising during the programming period, infrastructure coordination is of course also required for actual
investment projects’ implementation (Table 2). Here coordination gaps can arise practically during each
step of the project management cycle from ex-ante appraisal to ex-post evaluation, but also in the
regulatory framework governing this process.
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Table 1 Coordination gaps in intergovernmental relations on a programmatic level

Overall
Planning and
Investment
Strategies
Multi-Sector
relevant
planning and
policies
Funding

Administrative
and Public
Services

Capacity

Description => potential remedy
Exists when different rationales among national and subnational policy makers create
obstacles for adopting convergent targets. Can lead to policy coherence problems and
contradictory objectives across investment strategies. => Need for instruments to align
objectives; need to align both appraisal as well as selection criteria for public
investment programs.
Results when line ministries do not align their policies (i) in a cross-sectoral fashion,
or (ii) vertically, when they need to be territorially implemented => Need for
mechanisms to create multi-dimensional/systemic approaches and to make these
engagements credible through national political leadership and commitment.
Unstable, no multi-annual or insufficient funding, or misaligned conditionalities
attached to transfers undermining effective execution of responsibilities at subnational
level or for shared competencies => Need effective incentives for partnership
approach when establishing cross-governmental financing mechanisms, including
conditionalities; determining the balance of co-finance with autonomous finance;
allowing a forward looking perspective through multi-annual budgeting.
Occurs when the administrative boundaries for infrastructure decisions do not
correspond to the socio-economic geographic area sharing the infrastructure and its
externalities => Need for instruments
to encourage collaboration between
jurisdictions and assignment of responsibilities for reaching “effective size”
(coordination tools among subnational units, reassignment of responsibilities at a
higher level of government, potential mergers of administrations, etc.)

Information
Asymmetries of information (quantity, quality, type) to
guide decision makers about the economic, environmental,
social and financial implications of investment; limited
central knowledge of local assets and needs; limited local
knowledge of central government programmes; limited data;
unclear or over local perception of investment gap and
service delivery problem to be addressed => Need for
instruments for revealing and sharing information; need to
address “optimism bias” of public investment

Coordination
gap

Arises when there is limited human, knowledge or institutional resources available to carry out tasks => Need for instruments
to build local capacity (top-down; or peer-to-peer); earmarking co-financing as a way to induce capacity while avoiding micro
management, performance assessment
Source: adapted from Charbit and Michalun (2009); Charbit (2011).

Table 2 Coordination gaps in intergovernmental relations on a project level
Coordination
gap

Description => potential remedy

Regulation:
public-private

Reflects difficulties in clear selection and appraisal criteria to involve private sector in a determined investment project, in
different stages of the project cycle => develop a “unified framework” for evaluation of public and private involvement; assess
risk and possibility to cope with financial risk and contingent liabilities; introduce “independent review” to weed out poor
projects early in the project cycle.

Responsibilities
over the
project cycle

Reflects difficulties in ensuring separate or sufficient accountability over specific steps in the project cycle (Pre-appraisal,
appraisal, procurement, monitoring of implementation; operation of facility, ex-post evaluation, among others), which can lead
to transparency integrity challenges for policy makers involved in the management of investment => Need for institutional
quality instruments; Need for instruments to strengthen the integrity framework at the local level (focus on public
procurement); Need for continuity in sub national public administration; Need for instruments to enhance citizens’
involvement
Arises when there is limited human, knowledge or institutional resources available to carry out tasks => Need for instruments
to build local capacity (top-down; or peer-to-peer); earmarking co-financing as a way to induce capacity while avoiding micro
management, performance assessment

Capacity

Source: adapted from Charbit and Michalun (2009); Charbit (2011).

This paper will focus mainly on intergovernmental coordination with regard to infrastructure
programming. While coordination mechanisms for actual project implementation (Table 2) are equally
relevant, other contributions in this volume focus on these aspects. The dividing line is not always perfect,
as several of the coordination instruments used in practice have multiple functionalities, serving
programming and project implementation periods, and are applied in diverse intergovernmental
frameworks in different political contexts. It also bears noting that the recent emphasis of the development
community on results and outcomes, which is adopted with quickening pace in the subnational and
intergovernmental area, blurs many of the traditional divisions for tools related to planning, funding and
budgeting and underline the powerful role of evaluation information in the design of investment policies.
5
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The objective of this paper is to explore the range of vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms
applied to intergovernmental coordination for public investment across OECD and selected non-OECD
countries. The goal of this assessment is to discuss their achievements as well as persisting challenges. To
this end, it attempts to relate existing mechanisms to the areas of potential gaps identified in Table 1,
namely policy misalignments, failures to coordinate cross-sectorally, gaps in joint financing mechanisms,
failure to achieve efficient scale, and gaps especially in subnational capacity. Two common
complementary devices for improving horizontal and vertical interactions among different levels of
government for infrastructure provision will be looked at, namely conditionality and contracts. This will be
followed by a discussion of the political economy risks if actors choose to opt out of coordination. The
final section will provide some conclusions about how coordination mechanisms need to be developed and
tailored to specific contexts.
Evidence presented in the following part of the paper is based on three main sources. The first one
encompasses a national level OECD questionnaire3 exploring the existing mechanisms and challenges as
well as best practices with regard to coordination and subnational capacity of public investment in general,
and infrastructure in particular. This is complemented by results from in-depth qualitative information
from seven subnational/regional case studies carried out across OECD countries, and selected choosing a
balance between EU and non-EU member countries, as well as economically strong and less strong regions
across those countries4. Finally, other country examples will be selected from past OECD work that
includes mostly OECD countries, but also some selected non-members (such as Brazil or Peru).
2.1 Vertical coordination mechanisms
Vertical alignment of infrastructure policy
Central and subnational governments are interdependent actors, who need to establish mechanisms for
coordinating their shared tasks of overall and sectoral planning, funding, and administering infrastructure
provision. Aligning policy and implementation across levels of government requires coordination during a
number of steps, not just co-financing. It requires actors to align their policy objectives, which in turn
requires exchanging information about regional realities and their respective policy preferences. If
governments fail to coordinate this may result in a highly fragmented approach to infrastructure policy,
potentially reinforcing inequalities and failing to make the most of available resources.
Central level actors acknowledge that they know very little about subnational needs and policy
preferences, while their subnational counterparts would like to be better informed about central level
policy priorities. The results presented in Figures 3 and 4 point to a significant information gap between
the central and subnational levels of government in terms of policy agendas. Regional case studies provide
a more differentiated interpretation of these results: in countries where subnational governments need to
secure central government financial or implementation support for the investment project they would like
to carry out (such as in Sweden or in Germany for financial support), for example, subnational authorities
seem well aware of the need to keep informed about central policy makers’ agendas. In other countries,
such as Peru, an absence of a mutual understanding of policy preferences between central and subnational
levels has led to infrastructure planning and priority setting to be conducted on a bottom-up basis, without
considering national top-down criteria in, for example, budgeting and regional development planning

3

The questionnaire was carried out as part of a wider project on systematically assessing coordination and
subnational capacity challenges across OECD countries. See project website:
http://www.oecd.org/regional/effectivenessofpublicinvestmentatsubnationallevelintimesoffiscalconstraints.htm
4

Case studies were carried out in Basilicata (Italy), Brandenburg (Germany), British Columbia (Canada), Galicia
(Spain), Skane (Sweden), Victoria (Australia), Wielkopolskie (Poland). Reports of each of the case studies can be
found at: http://www.oecd.org/regional/effectivenessofpublicinvestmentatsubnationallevelintimesoffiscalconstraints.htm
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procedures. This has resulted in significant fragmentation of policy and program practices across
subnational levels (Guerra-Garcia and Frank, forthcoming)

Lack of sub-national governments
engagement in priority setting process
Sub-national governments lack of
implementaion capacity
Sub-national governments lack cofinancing capacity
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Figure 3 Vertical coordination challenges of public investment, as seen from the center
Source: OECD national questionnaire, 2012.
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Figure 4 Vertical coordination challenges, as seen from the subnational level

Source: OECD regional questionnaire, 2012
To respond to those reciprocal needs, OECD countries have created different platforms that facilitate
communication and the alignment of interests around common investment policy objectives. National
bodies in charge of subnational coordination and fora in which subnational representatives gather are the
most frequent types of platforms. Most federal countries have created such platforms to exchange
information on policy objectives between the different levels of government. In Germany or Spain, for
example there are so called “conferences”, or in the German case also the “Joint Tasks”, in specific sectors,
like science or regional development, in which different levels of government regularly gather to determine
policy priorities. Even though the German Länder still rely on approval and implementation of specific
infrastructure projects by the central government, through the existing platforms, they can better prepare
and align their preferences with the central government ones.
In a number of federal OECD countries platforms that facilitate the federal-state dialogue have long been
established. In Canada the provinces, through their own platform, deliberate among themselves to
determine investment priorities, while federal arms of the government are located in the provinces (e.g. the
7
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Regional Federal Councils or the Regional Development Agencies) to ensure the central government’s
priorities are represented, and to communicate the provinces’ priorities to the federal authorities. The
federal-state dialogue in Australia is organized through the Council of Australian Governments. In Italy,
political dialogue is ensured through the State-Regions Conference, a permanent negotiation body. Another
example are the vertical coordination bodies established in many Latin American countries to organize
water policies across levels of government (see Box 1).
Box 1 Vertical coordination in Latin America’s River Basin Organizations
River basin organizations (RBOs) exist in a number of Latin American countries, including Argentina (River Basin
Committees), Brazil (where the first RBO was created in 1970), Costa Rica (where RBO’s are regulated by the
2000 Law on Water Resources), Nicaragua (Regional Organizations for River Basins), and others in Panama,
Mexico and Peru. In most cases, the principal actors in RBO’s are central government ministries and public
agencies and/or local and regional authorities. Sometimes, river basin authorities are also accountable to citizens
and NGOs. In the sample of countries surveyed in the OECD study, basin authorities are financed both by
autonomous budgets (e.g. collection of water revenues) and grants from the central government, and in some
cases, sub-national governments also contribute to river basin authorities’ funding (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico).
RBO’s missions, constituencies and financing modes vary across LAC countries. All river basin authorities have
functions related to planning, data collection, harmonization of water polices and monitoring. However, their role
in the allocation of water uses, prevention of pollution, co-ordination, financing and regulation is not systematic,
and none of the LAC countries’ river basin organizations (contrary to OECD ones) have regulatory powers. The
maturity of river basin organizations also varies across LAC countries, especially in coordinating competing uses,
which requires equitable approaches to resolving conflicts in the political and legal arenas. Argentina and Brazil
are pioneers in setting up river basin agencies, while other LAC countries, such as Peru, have only recently
adopted such arrangements areas.
Source: OECD, 2012a.

Some of the more centralized countries have more informal platforms for consultation. In Norway, for
example, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development gathers with all regional
administrations and other relevant regional stakeholders to inform them about central policies for regional
development and to discuss issues important to the regions. In Sweden, subnational administrations take
central information platforms as opportunities to lobby for infrastructure investments at the center that will
ultimately decide upon, finance and implement them.
Cross-sectoral coordination
The effectiveness of intergovernmental policy coordination also depends on the extent to which
infrastructure policy is coordinated and aligned across line ministries. Policy complementarities matter to
mutually reinforce the impact of different sectoral actions on an infrastructure policy outcome in specific
places. Despite this, even highly decentralized federal systems have been shown to work in a deeply
sectorally entrenched way (OECD, 2011b). Entrenched sectoral approaches at the national level hamper
the necessary coordination of infrastructure implementation at the subnational level. Central levels of
governments need to commit resources to align policies and their implementation at the subnational level.
In many places, subnational governments have worked to make up for gaps in sectoral coordination at the
central level. In Poland, for example, information on infrastructure investment decisions and their locations
rests within various sectors and does not get communicated consistently to subnational governments which
are aiming to execute their spatial planning role. Subnational actors need to engage in an effort to find and
collect the information necessary, thereby collaborating with each of the sectoral ministries separately to
draw up spatial plans at the subnational level. This process generates transaction costs and makes it harder
to realize potential synergies among a wide range of infrastructure policies, such as transport, the
environment and housing for example. In Spain bilateral agreements are made between regions and the
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center (convenios de collaboración) that cover much of their cooperation. The convenios (see also section
2.3 on contracts) tend to be sectoral and are distributed across the central ministries. To overcome potential
entrenchments, the region of Galicia has developed a multi-annual strategic plan that brings together
several regional-level sectoral plans, including those for road infrastructures, transport, water and
innovation, with the aim of avoiding conflicting objectives and improving outcomes. In Germany, Land
Brandenburg has engaged in an effort to bundle the different sources of funding (such as from the Joint
Task, EU funds, etc.) that make up the roughly 10% of its budget over which it has real spending
discretion, as opposed to other resources that are pre-committed to centrally decided spending targets. This
bundling of resources ensures maximum coherence between different policies at the state level. In addition,
it has inter-ministerial working groups involving Land ministries. One challenge the Land faces at the
moment is that the funding instruments of the Joint Task and the EU have different programming periods.
This is contrasted by the central level approach to coordinating between the center and the Länder that
remains very sectorally driven, with few cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms that are as firmly
institutionalized as the vertical ones.
In the absence of national cross-sectoral coordination, however, regional efforts to realize policy
complementarities can be undermined. Region Skåne in Sweden has both sectoral (e.g. transport,
innovation) and cross-sectoral regional development strategies. They are the outcome of an important
effort to define a regional development policy. However, it has had only limited impact, as the region lacks
the resources to finance it and the plan is not tied to resource commitments from local or central sectoral
budgets. As long as the regional strategy is not linked to a concrete implementation plan supported by
financial commitments, it is unlikely to leverage the expected policy complementarities.
2.2 Horizontal coordination mechanisms
There are two main drivers that necessitate horizontal coordination across subnational jurisdictions. First,
positive (and negative) spillover effects of infrastructure projects may challenge the traditional
management of public investment within administrative boundaries, creating incentives for other
jurisdictions to free-ride on infrastructure provided by others. This may eventually lead to an underprovision of infrastructure. Secondly, it may not always be effective to implement infrastructure projects
along jurisdictional borders. Limited in size, jurisdictions could largely benefit from investing together
with other jurisdictions in terms of economies of scale. A more function- instead of administrative
boundary-oriented approach to decentralized infrastructure provision may also be useful to allow for local
synergies in infrastructure policy making (OECD 2013b; Frey and Eichenberger 1996 and 1999).
Signifcant engagement can be observed across countries to encourage horizontal coordination
The great majority of OECD countries have mechanisms in place to encourage coordination across
subnational governments. Two-thirds of the countries responding to the OECD questionnaire report having
mechanisms in place to encourage subnational coordination across jurisdictions, both at local and
intermediate levels of government. Federal or quasi-federal countries all report to have such mechanisms in
place. A recent survey in the water sector revealed that a majority of Latin American countries has also put
in place horizontal coordination mechanisms, including Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (OECD, 2012a). In certain countries a collaborative culture has to be
created, especially in those where forced mergers have not nourished such a culture at the onset.
Strengthening such collaboration where it has historically been weak involves certain risks, as there may
be a lack of or limited inter-institutional trust on the subnational level, stemming from a planning tradition
oriented towards the center, such as is the case for Poland.

9
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Coordinatioon across medium tiers of government
The mechanisms employed to foster inter-jurisdictional coordination vary widely. They can range from the
legal requirement to collaborate across states, such as enshrined in Mexico’s planning law, to the creation
of special purpose cross-border platforms like the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (incorporating both
Canadian provinces and US states). In countries like Italy and Switzerland, collaboration between regions
is financially incentivized. In Switzerland, one-third of subnational funding from the central government is
reserved for inter-cantonal investment projects. In addition, some 800 inter-cantonal agreements have been
created that focus on collaboration in specific fields, such as fishing, healthcare services, inter-cantonal
roads and police networks. The fiscal decentralization reform of 2008 further reinforced these agreements,
allowing the central government to forbid cantons from opting out of specific agreements.
Coordination across local government tiers
Local horizontal coordination has been encouraged through “soft” mechanisms, like policy-exchange
fora, as well as “harder” financial incentives. A number of countries (e.g., Canada, Sweden) have
established fora to facilitate policy dialogue among municipalities. More formal mechanisms include the
provision of financial preferences at the national level for joint subnational public investment proposals;
Estonia, Spain and Norway all use such measures. In Portugal, grants are provided under the National
Strategic Reference Framework for the 2007-2013 European Union programming period to establish and
implement territorial development plans among collaborating municipalities. In some countries, there have
been efforts to reduce the need for such special arrangements by “scaling up” municipalities or regions, in
an effort to strengthen their capacities and/or reduce fragmentation and administration costs. Denmark, for
example, reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98 and the number of regions from 16 to 5 in a
reform that took effect in 2007. Most other countries have preferred to encourage voluntary mergers, albeit
with limited impact in most cases (e.g., Finland and others). Sweden has been trying to encourage a bottom
up consolidation of its 22 counties, but the outcome of this effort remains unclear (OECD, 2010). France is
the OECD country with the greatest fragmentation at municipal level, but it has made extensive use of
agreement mechanisms to foster cooperation among its 36,000 municipalities (Box 2).
Box 2 Using incentives to promote municipal cooperation: the case of France
France has more than 36 000 communes (the basic unit of local governance),. Nevertheless, France has long
resisted municipal mergers. Though many are too small to be fully efficient, municipalities are considered as an
essential component of the French democracy. For more than three decades, the central government has been
encouraging cooperation among municipalities, both to allow small rural communes to surpass minimal thresholds
necessary to provide public services, and to allow urban areas, which are often fragmented into several
municipalities, to be managed coherently. There are approximately 19 000 inter-communal structures aimed
specifically at facilitating horizontal cooperation, and almost all municipalities are involved in them. There are
three main types of supra-communal structures: communities of communes (groupings of small rural communes),
“agglomeration” communities (groups of 50 000 inhabitants subject to a single business tax), and the urban
communities (groupings of 500 000 inhabitants or more). Each grouping of communes constitutes a “public
establishment for inter-communal cooperation” (EPCI). The EPCIs assume limited, specialized, and exclusive
powers transferred to them by member communes. Unlike the communes themselves, the EPCI is not governed
by elected officials, but by delegates of municipal councils. Although the EPCI are created by the communes
directly, there are two notable roles for the central government. First, EPCIs must be approved by the state in
order to exist legally. Second, to encourage municipalities to form an EPCI, the central government provides an
“inter-communality grant” to those communes that accept a single business tax. This is to preclude competition on
tax rates among participating municipalities. EPCIs draw on budgetary contributions from member communes (for
the syndicates) and/or their own tax revenues (for the EPCIs).This inter-municipal level has become the key actor
for big infrastructure investment or environment-related investments (such as for water infrastructure). Reforms
are currently discussed for making this inter-municipal approach more effective and for developping new
governance schemes for metropolitan areas.
Source: Charbit and Vammalle (2010); OECD (2006).
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Demographic change has been an important driver for efforts to encourage scale efficiency at local level,
particularly in low-density regions where population ageing and out-migration are making it increasingly
difficult to sustain service provision. After a wave of top-down enforced municipal mergers to down-size
local administrations following unification, Germany has had to respond to demographic change in the last
years by trying to streamline public service provision at the local level. Demographic change has left some
municipalities shrinking, with the per capita costs of infrastructure investment and service provision
increasing. Therefore some Länder, such as Brandenburg, implemented a directive5 on the financial
support for voluntary municipal mergers, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and quality of service
provision at the municipal level. In 2012, EUR 10 million have been allocated to support municipal
mergers, whereby EUR 50,000 are offered for municipalities where some administrative functions are
merged, and up to EUR 500,000 for entire mergers of municipalities’ administrations. Among the first
ones to take up this initiative one finds cities and their adjacent municipalities.
Another incentive for horizontal collaboration may lie in strengthening subnational governments in their
dealings with the central government. For example, Region Skåne in Sweden has had an incentive to cooperate with its much smaller neighbors across the larger South Sweden Region in pursuit of shared
priorities. Their joint weight shapes the negotiations at national level. One such sector where this plays a
role is transport infrastructure and specifically projects that increase the connectivity between southern
Sweden and its capital. The extension of the railway lines to Stockholm is one recent example.
In Canada a culture of inter-jurisdictional collaboration has given rise to many forms of encouraging joint
infrastructure management. In a more top-down fashion, British Columbia (BC) can create inter-municipal
institutions, oblige municipalities to adhere to them, and review their mandates when it deems this
necessary. BC has created a number of institutions in an effort to facilitate coordination between
municipalities and reach efficient scale for service provision and public investment (regional districts,
Trans Link, British Columbia Rail Company, etc), as well as authorities that run specific public services
for the municipalities. Once created, they are administered independently of the province, directed by a
board that represents the relevant interests given their mandate (municipalities, regional districts, civil
society, etc). They are funded by specific taxes and fees and are not allowed to run budget deficits, but they
may borrow for capital investment. By providing services to a pool of municipalities, they allow for
economies of scale and lower prices. The Municipal Finance Authority (MFA) is one such example,
financing most of regional districts’ and municipalities long-term debt, and encompassing all local
governments in British Columbia except the City of Vancouver. Regarding public transportation, the
province decided in 1999 to create Trans Link, an independent regional authority to which it gave the
mandate of designing, building, financing and managing the public transit system in the regional district of
Vancouver.
Persistent challenges though exist
Horizontal collaboration nevertheless faces significant challenges. In Mexico, for example, states have
autonomy in their designated fields of competence, which makes it difficult to coordinate agendas,
priorities and fiscal resources with other states. A number of governments point to a perceived lack of
capacity for horizontal collaboration at subnational level (e.g., Sweden). In other cases, competition
between subnational tiers of government for central level funding often undermines collaboration
incentives (e.g., Germany and Switzerland). Supranational institutions (such as the EU) have not yet
adapted all their structural/cohesion fund rules that would allow regions using obtained funds for crossjurisdictional projects.

5

See website link for the directive’s content: http://www.mi.brandenburg.de/cms/detail.php/bb1.c.253080.de
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Inter-jurisdictional competition and regulatory impediments also complicate efforts to foster horizontal
collaboration at local level in many places. In Estonia, for example, municipalities compete to obtain
funding from higher levels of government. A lack of strategic planning capabilities at the local level may
impede inter-municipal collaboration as well (e.g., Slovenia or Canada). Regulatory impediments may also
arise. National legislation may raise the costs associated with organizing joint undertakings among
municipalities (OECD, 2011c; 2012b).
Differences in size, wealth and priorities can make it difficult for neighboring municipalities to reconcile
investment decisions together, particularly where very large agglomerations are engaged with much
smaller municipalities. Cooperation can also be difficult where there are significant differences in income
levels between adjacent jurisdictions. Yet competitive pressures arise even in a partnership of equals. For
example, in low-density places like Slovenia (OECD, 2011c) or south-eastern Sweden, municipalities can
readily see the scale economies to be realized by collaborating in fields like education and health care, but
each may fear that its own long-term viability depends in part on ensuring that the key facilities (and
related employment) are located within its jurisdiction.
2.3 Encompassing instruments to structure vertical or horizontal coordination: the case of
conditionalities and intergovernmental contracts
Conditionality and intergovernmental contracts6 are encompassing, crosscutting mechanisms for
coordination. They can help actors across levels of government to address a number of existing
coordination challenges simultaneously and can employ different coordination devices together.
Conditionality can be used to address the lack of horizontal collaboration, for example, by making it a
requirement in earmarked transfers for infrastructure investment. Mutually designed and agreed upon
contracts across levels of government can improve the basis of information on common policy priorities,
make objectives clear and transparent, as well as commit all levels to generate and use information on
infrastructure performance outcomes. The two instruments can, of course, be employed as complements
rather than substitutes: conditionality can be part of a contract design, and in fact, very often is. Contracts
simply take the discussion a step further, creating credible partnership arrangements between levels of
government that allow for mutual accountability as well as alignment of responsibilities and resources to
generate a well-coordinated approach and joint commitment to infrastructure policy. A very powerful
dimension of the contractual approach may lie in the fact that it includes information about the
enforcement mechanism that guarantees the credibility of both parties’ commitments (OECD 2007).

6

A contract is a set of mutual promises by which the parties commit themselves either to take actions or to follow the prescription of a decision
mechanism that has been mutually agreed upon. In the latter case, the contract is an agreement by which decision-making rights are transferred
among parties. In the case of contracts among levels of government, contracts allow the reorganisation of the rights and duties of governments
other than by changes to the constitution (OECD 2007).
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Box 3 From program to project contracting - transactional versus relational contracts
The typology of contracts identified in earlier OECD work lends itself to distinguishing contracts according to their
proram or project nature (as identified in Table 1 above). “Transactional” contracting involves an ex-ante
determination of the complete set of binding and enforceable rights and duties of the parties. This includes the
coordination arrangements. The key challenge concerns the incentives needed to encourage the parties to make
good on their obligations. The resulting contracts are contingent, complete (in theory, at least), often
complemented by an incentive mechanism and ultimately enforced by third parties, such as the judiciary. By
contrast, “relational” contracting involves parties committing to co-operate ex-post (after the signing of the
agreement) and supervision of compliance with the agreement tends to be project-based, bilateral, relying on a
cooperative spirit. In other words, their primary purpose is not to fix the parties into a complete set of binding and
enforceable commitments but rather to serve as mechanism for collective decision-making which generates trust
and facilitates cooperation, information-sharing and capacity building. In practice, most contracts are
characterized by both transactional and relational elements and fall somewhere on a continuum from being pure
transactional to pure relational contracts.
Source: OECD (2007).

A partnership approach to conditionality is likely to reinforce its effectiveness
Nearly all OECD countries use some type of conditionality attached to central government transfers to
ensure infrastructure provision across levels of government. 17 of the 22 OECD countries responding to
the questionnaire report that inter-governmental transfers come with certain conditionalities defined by the
central government and, in EU countries, they are often subject to requirements defined by the supranational level – the European Commission. The most frequent conditions attached to central funding
include matching (co-financing) and reporting requirements, as well as predetermined timeframes for
spending investment funds. In most of the respondent countries, earmarking, environmental assessments
and additionality requirements are also frequently applied (Figure 5).
Matching requirements
Reporting requirements
Timeframe for spending
Earmarking all or parts of grants
Environmental impact assesment
Additionality requirements
Implementation of specific reforms
Ex-ante economic evaluation
Involvement of several municipalitities
Private sector participation in financing investments
Private sector participation in designing investment strategy
0

5

10

15

Figure 5 Types of conditionalities attached to public investment funds
Source: OECD national questionnaire, 2012
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Conditionality can be an effective tool to align objectives across levels of government and strengthen
mutual accountability, but in OECD countries a partnership approach is key to make them an effective
instrument of coordination. Several countries report having found conditionality, including the timeframe
of spending, earmarking and matching requirements, as well as ex-ante assessments, effective tools for
framing policies and strategic planning across levels of government. They find that conditionality has
contributed to a better understanding of local conditions at the central level (e.g. Slovak Republic, Estonia,
and Italy). In Estonia and Canada, conditionality has helped to enhance systematic assessments of likely
and actual impacts of investments, thereby reducing the incidence of “bad” investments. In Norway and
Italy, conditionality has successfully encouraged the concentration of resources, thereby making it easier to
promote and anticipate crucial infrastructure investments. Even though only just over half of the
respondent countries report that conditionality poses an additional administrative burden, it is not
perceived as being very effective in increasing the quality of investment projects. This may point to the
fact that conditionality is still largely applied as a control instrument, rather than an outcome-oriented tool
that decreases inefficiencies that may arise in lengthy and unorganized coordination. Also, ill-defined,
exhaustive top-down developed conditionality can render itself ineffective because there may not be
sufficient ownership at the subnational levels to implement its prescriptions. Generally speaking, the
effects of reputation attached to results seem to be more powerful tools than sanctions with regard to
positively influencing subnational entities.
Intergovernmental contracts encourage processes and outcomes
Contracts are a more ambitious mechanism that allow for a tailor-made approach to arranging
responsibilities across governments. They are distinguished by the fact that they are formal devices to
enable governments across levels to arrange joint action or to delegate action, as independent entities, and
to clarify the complexity of processes and responsibilities for subnational infrastructure investment. This
can be useful not only because of the inherent inter-dependencies among levels of government involved in
the design and execution of infrastructure projects, but also because the assignment of responsibilities
among levels of government can be “imperfect”. There may be overlaps leading to shared responsibilities,
or policy domains not specifically assigned to any level of government, which all give rise to the need for
cooperation and clarification of roles arises. Contractual arrangements present the advantage of avoiding a
one-size-fits-all approach and leaving scope for adapting policies to specific subnational infrastructure
policies. They thereby help to address asymmetries of information and potential differences in capacity.
Contracts can be useful in unitary or federal contexts. In unitary states, contracts are often used in the
framework of decentralization policies, to empower subnational levels of government or delegate the
implementation of public investment tasks. In that context, they tend to be long-term agreements. These
can be quite effective for managing policy processes that unfolded in stages over an extended period,
particularly where they are innovative or experimental in nature and thus imply a need for periodic
feedback and adjustment. In a federal state, contracts are more complementary, specifying cooperation on
tasks that are not defined by existing constitutions or legal frameworks. This can often be the case for new
or intermittent measures, such as innovation policies or the implementation of stimulus packages (as seen
during the economic crisis). Such contracts tend to have a narrow focus and be of a short-term duration
(OECD, 2007).
Contracts are frequently used as a coordination instrument between levels of government for governing
investment policy in OECD countries. Figure 6 shows that intergovernmental contracts are one of the most
frequent tools used to govern the interaction of different levels of government. They are used in federal as
well as unitary systems (e.g. Canada, Italy, Spain, France, and Portugal). Contracts are quite powerful
instruments for cross-governmental coordination: they are frequently concluded by high-level political
actors, and they often include both dedicated budgets to ensure implementation and clearly defined
mechanisms to resolve any conflicts that arise (Box 4 and 5).
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Specific
institution
rather than
authority
25%

Contractual
arrangement/pa
rtnership
agreements
42%

Several sectoral
authorities
33%

Figure 6 Mechanisms used for cross-governmental coordination
Source: OECD national questionnaire, 2012

Box 4 Intergovernmental Contracts in Poland
The initial regional contracts in Poland served as a learning device preparing the regional authorities for the
management of the EU Structural Funds in a multi-level setting The contracts created a stable and multi-annual
framework for cross-level coordination, allowing regional authorities to complete long-term investment plans.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the contracts remained stuck in what was previously a centralized
framework, rather than putting the regions at the center of regional development policy-making. Instead of
introducing a coordinated, place-based approach, the contracts served as a tool for the local implementation of
national programs, the need for which arose because fiscal decentralization did not match the regions’ assigned
responsibilities. This reinforced their financial dependence on the central government. The center’s approach to
managing EU Structural Funds further undermined the regions’ role, making the regional contracts simply an
instrument part of the EU funded programs instead of regional policy planning and coordination instruments. The
National Regional Development Strategy for 2010-2020, which replaces the existing contracts, aims at introducing
a more integrated and place-based approach to create synergies between all regional policy instruments having a
territorial dimension across levels of government, especially by specifying the sources of funding for the strategy’s
envisioned interventions.

Source: Ferry, 2003; Regulski et al., 2012; OECD, 2008
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Box 5 The Vancouver Agreement – bringing actors across levels together through successful contracts
The Vancouver Agreement is an example for successful collaboration and coordination between the Government
of Canada (central level), the Government of British Columbia (intermediate tier) and the City of Vancouver
(municipal level) to establish horizontal governance mechanisms to tackle economic, social and health policy
challenges in the metropolitan area of Vancouver. The agreement was characterized by an open, flexible
partnering arrangement, based on equality of all partners that do not know ex-ante the precise goals of their
cooperation, but wish to engage in a long-term collaboration and coordination process (a “relational contract”).
Credibility and enforcement of the contract commitments was fostered by various means. Negotiated annual
updates to the schedule of initiatives and commitments were required. All governments were directed to work
within their own jurisdictions and mandates, and accountable to their electorate. In addition, political and
administrative supervision mechanisms were established that supported contract implementation monitoring.
In an evaluation carried out 10 years after the VA’s establishment, participants were unanimously positive in their
response, acknowledging that the prior existence of jurisdictional fragmentation was successfully addressed
through the VA. The VA was found to have strengthened relationships, especially also with the local community
and the private sector, achieved through a constant collaboration and coordination of resources to ensure
effective and efficient investment. The generalizable conclusions from the VA experience seem to be twofold: first
of all successful contracts need a clear description of the roles of each participating level of government. In
addition, each participant needs to be accountable; therefore accountability mechanisms have to be equally
designed at the contractual development stage.

Source: OECD, 2007; Western Economic Diversification Canada (2010)

Form existing intergovernmental contracts important lessons can be drawn out:




First, contracts seem to be an effective instrument to introduce a coordinated approach to local,
integrated development policies. They seem to succeed in bringing actors together to form a joint
policy strategy.
Secondly, however, the contracts remain largely unsuccessful in changing existing fragmented and
compartmentalized structures, because the relevant competences that go along with the strategies
often remain unchanged.
Thirdly, while contractual arrangements can be employed as a capacity-building device, they run
the risk of creating “parallel” structures to existing administrative processes, which increase the
administrative burden at the local and higher levels to engage in these new structures.

Therefore, it is crucial to make sure contractual arrangements are as much as possible aligned with existing
ways of “doing business”, and go along with a training for all levels of government in knowing how to
implement the agreed arrangements.
2.4 The need for information to make coordination work
Information lies at the core of making coordination work. Information is essential to the alignment of
objectives and assessment of projects, as well as mutual accountability and transparency. Information
collected through monitoring and evaluating public investment also lies at the heart of efforts to increase
the efficiency and effectiveness of subnational infrastructure provision.
Monitoring has become a standard for ensuring the success of an investment project; all national and
regional governments answering the project questionnaire report that monitoring is carried out in one
form or another. In their responses to the survey, the great majority of countries reported that some form of
performance monitoring of public investment projects is conducted at central government level (Figure 7).
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This includes the use of performance indicators as well as the formulation of objectives defined in form of
target values (OECD, 2009). Strikingly, the exceptions to this rule include both very decentralized
federations, in which federal-level monitoring might transgress on the rights of the federal units, and highly
centralized countries, in which the sums available to the regional level for regional development are
typically very small (even if larger sums go to local governments, which are monitored).
none
2%

SNG
30%
Central Ssector
45%
Supra-national
level
23%

Figure 7 Level at which monitoring is performed
Source: OECD national questionnaire, 2012.

Robust ex-post evaluations are picking up gradually as over half of the regions surveyed report that they
conduct ex-post evaluations. Generally speaking, monitoring and evaluation will only become effective
coordination tools if the information generated facilitates learning, and makes actors become accountable
to their citizens as well as their partners in government. This means that results of evaluations have to be
used for shaping future policies and inscribed in long-term partnerships where evaluation results should
inform consecutive program phases (encouraging engagement for results through “repeated games”
settings).
2.5 –The political economy risks of actors “opting out”
Coordination is not a self-fulfilling goal—it is as rational to refuse to coordinate as it is to collaborate
vertically and horizontally. Coordination instruments such as conditionalities or contracts cannot per se
guarantee the implementation of agreed decisions. Political or economic incentives may persist for actors
to not comply or opt out of coordinating with other levels of government or jurisdictions at the same level.
This may lead to administrative inefficiency, redundancy of infrastructure provision, and misalignment of
development policies across levels of government. As a result a central government may be confronted
with a highly fragmented territory in practice where it will eventually face difficulties to implement
country-wide policies.
A key political economy risk in intergovernmental coordination lies in the multiple principal-agent
relationships that may lead to blurred accountability and disincentives to coordinate. If interpreted in a
simplified way through principal-agent theory, subnational governments are subject to two principals – the
central (or supra-national) governments and their electorate. On the one hand, it may bring higher
political/electoral rewards for subnational governments to engage in infrastructure investments that serves
their jurisdiction only than one in which such rewards are either fully or partly attributed to other
subnational governments, even if the jurisdiction can share the utilization of the infrastructure. On the other
17
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hand, subnational governments are, to different extents, dependent on the central governments to provide
them with grants and transfers as well as autonomy to implement their infrastructure priorities. If well
designed, the central government can use this lever to increase incentives in a way that maximize
infrastructure efficiency and effectiveness.
The “principal-agent” relationship between central and subnational governments may be further
undermined by political party affiliation. On the one hand central level governments may, as has been
shown in a number of political economy works, exercise preferential treatment in subnational jurisdictions
that share the government’s party affiliation. And the same may be true for subnational governments. They
may be less inclined to work towards a common infrastructure policy, if they have a different party
affiliation than the center. On the other hand, the party belonging may be of limited impact in comparison
with local re-elections perspectives for shaping subnational policy makers’ behavior.
When it comes to vertical coordination, as a rule, it would not be at all surprising that the level of
government with fewer resources had a greater incentive to understand the priorities of the betterresourced tier. The risk, of course, is that the subnational levels’ development priorities may be warped by
the need to align with central agendas. A related risk lies in the possibility that central actors will focus on
those subnational partners who are politically or administratively more adept at responding to signals about
the center’s priorities – i.e., those who know best how to “play the game”. Therefore capacity building is
needed across administrative places and localities to ensure equity and sustainability in vertical
engagements of subnational tiers with their central governments.
Central governments therefore need to set the right incentives to overcome political economy challenges.
In the above we have seen that central governments have successfully encouraged collaboration across
subnational levels of government, when financial incentives were provided. Vertical coordination has
worked in federal as well as unitary countries, when lower levels of government could gain necessary
information on central level priorities, based on which they framed their local level preferences.
Conditionalities per se may also not be effectively enforced, unless they were developed in an inclusive,
top-down manner. Contracts can, and should have, built-in enforcement mechanisms, such as performance
indicators. In addition, the reputational and capacity building effects of such mechanisms may often be
effective enforcement instruments, even more than pure sanction devices that are difficult to implement
across levels of government and may incite narrow instead of “complete” engagement by implicated
actors.
3. Lessons learned
Gaps in coordination have widely been recognized, however they still exist. This paper has shown that, to
different extents, in the majority of OECD and the selected subset of non-OECD countries recognizing the
potential costs to failures in coordination has led to the introduction of several instruments to facilitate
intergovernmental coordination. However challenges are still widespread. Vertical coordination is
hampered by asymmetric information. Gaps in information sharing, impeding the development of a shared
policy vision, exist both from the center to the subnational levels of government and vice versa. Capacity
issues, especially in terms of co-financing infrastructure investments, hamper subnational governments to
carry out their assigned roles properly. Instead of encouraging horizontal coordination, central
governments sometimes set incentives for subnational jurisdictions to compete with each other to obtain
funding (such as in Germany). Multiple principal-agent relationships may undermine the incentives of
lower levels of government to engage horizontally with other actors. Finally, encompassing instruments
such as conditionality or intergovernmental contracts have proven their usefulness, but they have also
shown to reinforce skewed incentives, if political economy risks (such as asymmetric information,
externalities and accountability) are not considered in their design.
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Challenges to intergovernmental infrastructure coordination in OECD countries also exist in different
nuances in developing countries. In OECD countries, central governments may face bigger challenges in
overcoming very strong identities formed by traditional administrative boundaries at the subnational level
that may pose significant obstacles in making horizontal coordination work. In more developing country
contexts, the risk of capture may loom larger, and the central government may develop a tendency to
collaborate vertically more with the actors that are already comparatively stronger than others. A more indepth investigation into a sub-set of developing countries in the future could greatly enrich the debate on
global challenges with intergovernmental coordination.
The need for intergovernmental coordination has reinforced the importance of accountability. Actors
engaged in horizontal or vertical collaboration with different levels of government may have to engage in
an ever greater effort to ensure accountability towards their own electorate, while at the same time the
higher governmental tier. Subnational governments may find themselves in often contradictory incentive
mechanisms, where important trade-offs have to be made. Central governments have an important
responsibility to ensure that subnational governments are subject to the right incentives, and can be
accountable for their engagement in intergovernmental coordination of infrastructure policy.
No matter how well designed coordination mechanisms are, they remain ineffective if they are not
enforceable. There are a number of instruments central governments can use to enforce intergovernmental
coordination for infrastructure investments. Financial incentives have proven effective when it comes to
encouraging horizontal collaboration. A center-focused decision making of infrastructure investments has
made subnational actors adapt their policy options, aligning them more with the center. Conditionality and
contracts can be effective instruments for defining potential punishments if actors do not comply to
previously agreed upon collaboration. It can be observed, however, that the instruments are undermined if
subnational actors are not integrated in the development and negotiation of the framing conditions.
To make coordination happen and to make it work effectively requires collecting and sharing information.
The essence of making coordination work lies in the collection and availability of information; hence any
coordination mechanism implemented has to be coupled to a strategy for information collection and
sharing, including with civil society.
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